A Letter to Mr. Montesa

By Patricio P. Diaz


GENERAL SANTOS CITY (MindaNews/18 November) -- This letter is addressed to Peace Process Assistant Secretary Camilo “Bong” Montesa. However, since it is of general concern, it is open to all the readers of MindaNews to read and comment.


Dear Mr. Montesa,

From your speech at the conference of the Mindanao Working Group last November 12, it feels upbeat to know that “exciting things are happening inside the GRP-MILF peace process” in “the past four months” – as published in MindaNews last November 15.

No one can disagree with your analogical comparison in general of the peace process to the computer as an “operating system”. However, your discussions of specific “bugs” and their remedies elicit some questions.

May I proceed according to the sequence in your speech?

The MOA-AD “crash”:

You stated: “The MOA-AD (TRO) triggered attacks by a few MILF commanders on unarmed civilian communities and the subsequent military offensives to pursue and arrest these commanders brought war, once again, to Mindanao.”

Correct. But an unstated fact is crucial: There were provocations. The commanders were provoked by the TRO. Cotabato Vice Gov. Emmanuel Piñol, even before he filed

a petition for a TRO with the Supreme Court on July 23, 2008, had threatened “war” and the resurrection of the “Ilaga” because of the MOA-AD. The dual threats were not only against the MILF but the Muslims and were provocative.

Ignoring the provocations is only to half-state the “crash”. How can you fully solve the problem? Letting loose hell on the provoked but not minding the provokers is only to half-solve the problem, if not to worsen it.

*** *** ***

You identified three problems or “bugs” that caused the “crash”: “first, the lack of support and control; second, spoilers; and third, the need to protect civilians.” Let’s examine the “bugs” one by one.

Of the First:

You said: “While the panels were about to sign a significant agreement, they failed to rally their respective constituencies around it (MOA-AD)” – blaming the GRP and MILF peace panels for the “lack of support and control”, for the “fragile and weak … support for the peace process.”

Do you really mean that? Is the peace process not a team-play with the panels tasked to negotiate and the “support and control” provided by others -- in the case of the GRP, starting from the President? Does EO 3 not specifically assign to the PAPP the task to undertake the public “consultation process” to generate support for the agreement?

So far as it was reported in the media, the MILF did some consultations. Obviously, the government did not?

*** *** ***

In matters of “support and control”, should the President not take direct hand when it becomes necessary? President Fidel V. Ramos did that in the GRP-MNLF Jakarta peace talks. Why did President Arroyo not do the same?

President Ramos reined in the military when it wanted to launch an all-out operation after the raid of Ipil – the burning, looting and massacre – on April 4, 1995. Ramos, as the commander-in-chief, stopped what could have derailed the GRP-MNLF peace talk.

In contrast, what did President Arroyo do? She did not stop the military from launching the February 11, 2003 Pikit war and the post-MOA-AD war in August 2008. Could she have? Should she have to support the peace process? But she supported the two wars instead.

In June, July and August of 1996, the GRP-MILF agreement hit the same stone wall as the MOA-AD did – opposition from national and local Christian political leaders with violence and a case in the Supreme Court in prospect. President Ramos took a direct hand. He asked the Senate to conduct a nationwide consultation; he commissioned his executive secretary to talk to Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Chairman Nur Misuari.

Could President Arroyo not have saved the MOA-AD had she done what President Ramos did to save the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement? The Presidency has persuasive power that Congress, the Court and the local governments could not ignore.

She could have preempted the Supreme Court TRO; and, consequently avoided the international embarrassment in Kuala Lumpur on August 5, 2008, prevented the post-MOA-AD war and kept on course the peace process.

Note Very Well: Piñol filed his TRO case on July 23, five days before President Arroyo, in her State of the Nation Address on July 28, hailed the just initialed agreement as the “breakthrough” that would lead to a final agreement by the end of her term. Did she, in her euphoria, not know that a case had been filed to abort the MOA-AD? Or, was the case filed so secretly?

It was unbelievable that she did not know. Five days was so much time to persuade Piñol to withdraw his petition. If emissaries could not have prevailed on Piñol, she could have called him for a téte-á-téte in Malacañang.

At the Supreme Court, she abandoned the MOA-AD instead of defending it. She issued a new peace policy and disbanded the GRP peace panel to appease the opponents of the MOA-AD. The original policy and the GRP panel members became the scapegoats. That brought to mind a popular joke: “If you can’t solve a problem, revise it.”

It is inaccurate to attribute the “lack of support and control” to the failure of the peace panels “to rally their respective constituencies around it (MOA-AD”. In the first place, the panels had no constituencies. It is wrong to blame them for not doing what others – the President among them – ought to have done.

*** *** ***

Are you advocating that a peace agreement must be signed within the last seven and a half months of the Arroyo administration because with the change of the administration on June 30, 2010, there is no assurance (1) the support and control under the Arroyo administration will be continued; and, (2) the previous agreements will be honored?

What assurance really is there under President Arroyo? At that critical month of August 2008 and the following months the MOA-AD was denied “support and control” and was not “honored” as it so deserved – being the breakthrough in the long peace process as the President herself ecstatically proclaimed in her SONA 2008.

Of the Second:

You identified the “spoilers” and said: “The MOA-AD episode revealed how a few but determined and well-resourced ‘spoilers’ can derail and scuttle a process meant to benefit the many.”

Do you really mean that – the “spoilers” more determined than President Arroyo and better resourced than the Presidency? What a testimony to a weak Presidency! Could this be a significant reason for the peace process fiasco in her 9-year rule?

Of the Third:

What you said about the IDPs and the civilians is very true but that “there must be a mechanism to protect them” – meaning, there was no such mechanism – is fallacious.

What about the AFP as mandated in Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution: “… The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people ….” The irony was: The IDPs were punished by the military as assets of the MILF. They were not “people”.

What about the “Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Agreement of Peace of 2001” reiterating the “GRP-MILF Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities of 1997” and other agreements and enhancing them? This “Agreement” has implementing rules and mechanisms.

If the civilians were not protected under this “Agreement”, it was for the lack of sincerity to abide and the will to implement – not for the lack of mechanisms. Will GRP and the MILF have the sincerity and the will to honor other mechanisms?

All the “hostile prohibited acts” against the IDPs are enumerated in the “Agreement” – for instance, “burning of houses, places of worship and educational institutions, destruction of properties, and abuses of civilians” in Article II(3.1.2).

Remedies for hostile such acts are also mandated. For instance, in Article III(2): “The Parties agree to implement all necessary measures to normalize the situation in the conflict-affected areas, to pave the way for, and ensure successful rehabilitation and development of said areas.”

The atrocities suffered by the IDPs could have been avoided had Article III(11) been followed: “In cases of alleged violations of this agreement, the Parties shall refrain from taking offensives or punitive military actions of any type against each other without prior investigations by the CCCH of both Parties in coordination with the OIC Monitoring Team (IMT).”

There are more provisions in the “Agreement” to show that a must-mechanism has long been in place. However, the “Agreement” may be complemented or supplemented by other mechanisms.

Upgrading the System:

Upgrading the peace process may now be necessary after the MOA-AD was allowed to “crash”, the peace policy was revised and a new negotiating panel was constituted. May the solutions to the three “bugs” work!

The same hope goes with the (1) One Bangsamoro Challenge; (2) One Government Response; and (3) Task force HELP: Central Mindanao. The first two are the ideal – what should be. They are still in the “we want” stage. How doable are they?

The third was specifically created for the IDPs in Maguindanao, parts of Lanao del Sur, Sultan Kudarat and South Cotabato (Inquirer.net, July 13, 2009, citing Montesa). And, Philippine News Agency reported on July16, 2009 the President’s order to release P10 million for HELP’s projects and operating expenses. That was four months ago. From reports about Maguindanao IDPs, it is obvious they have not received HELP’s help.

What happened to the P10 million? You said, “The Mindanao Working Group should work closely with this Task Force. In what ways?

Your reasons to get excited are our reasons to raise questions Thank you. [“Comment" is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz' column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. Mr. Diaz is the recipient of a “Lifetime Achievement Award” from the Titus Brandsma for his "commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate." You may e-mail your comments to patpdiaz@mindanews.com]