An Inconsistency to the GRP-Moro Peace Process

By Ahmed Harris “Tommy” R. Pangcoga

Dialogue Mindanaw is an inconsistency to the GRP-Moro Peace Process. I make this assumption based on the “Theory of Interconnected or Embedded Peace Negotiations”1.

In this theory, we see two parties with a negotiation table and a backdoor in the middle. On each side are the panels, their principals, and their respective constituent masses. If we are to contextualize this theory to the whole GRP-Moro Peace Process, we see two negotiation tables, with the peace panels of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on one side and their counterpart peace panels of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) on the other side. The principals of the peace panels are the Central Committees of the MNLF and MILF and the GRP leadership. The panels cannot negotiate on anything without a “by-your-leave” from their respective principals. On their part, the principals set what contentious issues are to be negotiated by the panels. The constituent masses of the GRP, as claimed, are three – the majority mainstream, the Indigenous Peoples, and the Bangsamoro People. The constituent mass of the MNLF and MILF is only one – the Bangsamoro People. Now, the principals cannot be principals in a negotiation process without mandate from their respective constituent masses, whether under the Constitution or outside the Constitution but in a similar manner. Mandate, therefore, runs inwards, from the constituent masses, to the principals, and to the peace panels. Legitimacy of representation, on the other hand, runs outwards, from the peace panels, to their respective principals, and then to the constituent masses.

With these basic roles laid out, I find Dialogue Mindanaw as an inconsistency to the GRP-Moro Peace Process. It sticks out like a sore thumb. Somehow, it doesn’t belong.

Dialogue Mindanaw, as defined on its primer, is the “biggest communication plan” entered into by the GRP. In particular, it is a series of consultative activities covering nine key regions in Mindanao and four regions from the rest of the Philippines, with special focus on the Mindanao peace negotiation, and using a particularly designed process called “reflective dialogue.” It touches on “critical issues that are being discussed in the GRP-MILF peace talks” through three components, namely: 1) Public Relations and Media Advertising Campaign to reach a broader audience, 2) Public Conversations at the grassroots communities, and 3) Reflective Dialogues2.

The initiative and the people running Dialogue Mindanaw, as a whole, cannot be classified either as principal, or panel, or constituent mass in the embedded negotiation process, neither from the GRP side, nor from the MILF side, considering that it had consulted both the identified constituent masses of the principal parties involved in the GRP-Moro Peace Process.

Now, I wholeheartedly agree that there should be greater people’s participation in the peace process, not only in the GRP-MILF peace talks but in the entire GRP-Moro Peace Process. The majority mainstream, Indigenous Peoples, and Bangsamoro People (who are also indigenous to Mindanao, by the way) have every right to be informed and their sentiments heard by their principal representatives to the peace negotiations and that the latter’s respective decisions therein should be based on these sentiments. But establishing mechanisms that would enhance and ensure people’s participation should be consistent as well to the roles defined in the embedded negotiation process.

But who has the rightful obligation to consult these constituent masses? The inconsistency lies in the fact that, in this instance, it was not the MILF that consulted its constituent masses, but Dialogue Mindanaw, which is a government initiative. Through the “dialogue”, the GRP has reached out to the Bangsamoro People directly, the constituent masses of the two Moro fronts, and asked them what their views are in relation to restoring peace in Mindanao. If this course of action is related to the negotiation process, which it is, then this to me is unethical. As a matter of delicadeza, the GRP should have left it to the MILF to consult the Bangsamoro People. Let the GRP consult its own constituent masses, as it should. But let the MILF and MNLF consult the Bangsamoro People by themselves as well. A transparent stakeholders’ analysis is, therefore, in order.

Contrary to prevailing notions, “it is not the Bangsamoro People that belong to the MNLF, or the MILF. Rather, it is the MNLF and MILF that belong to the Bangsamoro People”3. It is from the “loins” of these long-suffering constituent masses that the MNLF, the MILF and all other manifestations of “freedom fighting” – armed or non-armed – past, present and future, have and will come forth from.

Furthermore, I believe this initiative has undermined several very important facts.

First, it has undermined the 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF and the 20-year long peace negotiations that led to it. This document has already been signed. The first phase has already been implemented (with questions and reservations on the part of the MNLF hierarchy, and contrary pronouncements on the part of the GRP) and has for several years now been in review (until when, we can only guess). What we are waiting for now are the results of this review and the manner by which the second phase of the Agreement will be implemented (and, maybe, how long and how consistent to the document it will be).

Second, it has undermined the 13-year long ongoing peace talks with the MILF. This negotiation is anchored on the presumed recognition of the GRP to the mandate given by the Bangsamoro People to the MILF; that they are the Bangsamoro People’s duly constituted representatives (or vanguards, if you will) in the peace talks, in particular, and in this people’s overall assertion to restore its lost right to self determination, in general. All interim agreements signed by the MILF with the GRP have been made with that mandate as basis.

Third, it has undermined the mandate of the Bangsamoro People itself given to the MNLF and the MILF (on separate occasions) to spearhead their assertion for the restoration of their lost right to self determination, whether through an armed struggle, or through the negotiation tables with the GRP (The Bangsamoro General Assembly at Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat in 1971 for the MNLF, the 3rd Bangsamoro General Consultative Assembly at Darapanan in 2005 for the MILF, etc). Both approaches have the end view that the historical injustices done to the Bangsamoro People would be acknowledged and appropriately addressed by the GRP.

Under the ambit of the peace talks, the mandate given by over two million Moro who attended the 3rd General Consultative Assembly at Camp Darapanan to the MILF was to engage with the GRP towards resolving the issue of what the GRP “can still return to the Bangsamoro and NOT what it can give. Because the Bangsamoro is not begging anything from the GRP.”4 (While ABS-CBN reported an attendance of one million in Darapanan 2005, the attendance sheets of the assembly was said to show over three million, so I take the median figure of over two million.) This clearly shows that mandate was already given and what specific task should be done. If Dialogue Mindanaw had consulted communities who had attended any of these Bangsamoro assemblies, then their consultations with them will have become moot and academic, in addition to being unethical. And they will have also contributed to the confusion that is already prevailing within the peace process.

Although the GRP also claims that its mandate comes not only from the mainstream majority and the Indigenous Peoples, but also from the Bangsamoro People (those who have decided to exercise their right to suffrage under the sovereignty of this Republic – though for decades the question as to whether this individual right has been accurately tabulated and counted during elections), this claim is suspect.

If Dialogue Mindanaw would claim that their consultation process is already a way of getting fresh mandate from the respective constituent masses of the GRP and the MILF, then I would cite the fact that this “authentic dialogue” of sorts is a unilateral initiative of the GRP and not a consensusly agreed one.

Fourth, it has undermined the historical antecedent of the Moro Question, to wit:

1. The Moro-Spanish Wars from 1578 to 1878, where the people of the sultanates, the principalities and their respective protectorates fought off wave after wave of Christianized natives from Luzon and Visayas who were drafted through the “polistas” law of the Spaniards to fight the Moro people in a three-century long attempt to colonize Mindanao.

2. The outright rejection of the Moro leaders to the offer of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo when he sought to develop a “national political vision” and talk about a “Philippine Nation” with them, because he was “300 years too late,” and that “when (the Moro people) were fighting to preserve their freedom, the Christianized natives (from) the north were helping the colonizers.”

3. The Treaty of Paris in 1898, which included MINSUPALA, the original ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro, as among the “commodities” sold by Spain to the US for 20 Million Mexican Dollars; this WITHOUT the Moro people’s knowledge and consent.

4. The February 1, 1924 Moro Declaration in Zamboanga, where Moro leaders called for the creation Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan as an “unorganized territory” of the US, separate and distinct from the Philippines (Luzon and Visayas). Or, that if this would not be granted, it be given its own independence as a “Moro Nation.”

5. The March 18, 1935 Dansalan Declaration, where Moro leaders expressed preference to remain under American rule and forecasted trouble should governance over the Moro people and their lands be placed under the “Christian Filipinos”, because ever since, the Moro and the Filipinos have never seen eye to eye.

6. The Kamlon Rebellion, the Bongabong Uprising, the Mindanao Independence Movement, etc., all of which are expressions of the strong desire of the Moro people to be restored of their right to self determination.

Add to this the centuries-long prejudice and discrimination of the majority mainstream towards the Moro people (a treatment that is still prevailing today), and the distrust of the Moro people towards the majority mainstream and their government.

Also, add to this the resettlement, pacification, assimilation and divide-and-rule programs initiated by the GRP, which has resulted to the systematic dispossession of ancestral lands from the Moro people in favor of settlers and multinational corporations.

And let us not forget the ever widening divergence amongst the Moro people. Many Moro may have forgotten, or may be ignorant of, or may have devalued the historical antecedent of the Moro Question and may have become contented and happy at being called and referred to as “Filipino-Muslims” rather than as “Moro” as a result. This portion of the Moro masses may be what is being claimed by the GRP as the source of their “Moro mandate” in the negotiation tables.

These are just a few of many other dilemmas being faced by them today.

Now, although it is stated that the results of the consultations of Dialogue Mindanaw are to be presented only to the two negotiating panels, the fact remains that (and I repeat) the consultations-cum-dialogue is a GRP initiative only, and NOT a joint action with the MILF.

And besides, the two panels cannot do anything to the results, except present these to their respective principals (the GRP itself and the MILF Central Committee) for consideration. The question now would be, will the MILF leadership recognize the legitimacy of an initiative that it had not only not agreed to, but also has usurped its rightful obligation to engage with its constituent masses?

Though the purpose and efforts of Dialogue Mindanaw is noteworthy and laudable, and the methodology of reflective dialoguing is excellent per se, the motives behind it – and the motives behind these motives – have become a source of suspicion for me. What I see is that Dialogue Mindanaw is there to help the GRP in “solving the Bangsamoro problem from its eyes, or in solving the GRP’s problem with the Bangsamoro, but it is NOT helping to solve the Bangsamoro problem as seen from the eyes of the Bangsamoro People.”5

As a Moro and as someone who works for justice and peace for my people and my progeny, the last thing we all want to be in is to be more confused. If we are to call for sincerity and greater people’s participation in the peace process, then let us also call for a sense of order and consistency to the peace process.

I do not know if the MNLF or MILF and their respective leaderships would agree to this analysis, but that is how I see it.

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1 Maria Ida Denise Giguiento and Jonathan Rudy. Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute. 2008

2 A Primer on Dialogue Mindanaw, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. 2010

3 Sammy P. Maulana, Secretary General, Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.



(Tommy Pangcoga is the Training and Project Development Officer of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society. He is a writer who considers himself a student of the GRP-Moro peace process.)